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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

By
By the fifteenth of the month, Mortgage
Mortgage Servicing Company
Company has
not received
received a payment from Borrower, one of many Georgia
Georgia
borrowers
whose
subprime
residential
mortgage
loan
it
services.'
borrowers
subprime residential
services. I
This is the third missed payment
payment in as many months, and the two
previous
delinquent.2 Mortgage Servicing
previous late payments
payments are still delinquent?
Servicing
purchased
and many other loans from
purchased the rights to service this a..lld
Mortgage
Trust,
a
subsidiary
of
an
investment
banking firm which
Mortgage
subsidiary
bought Borrower's loan from its originator
and pooled it along with
originator
33
Trust.
Mortgage
form
hundreds
hundreds more to form Mortgage Trust.
A Mortgage Servicing
Servicing associate consults with Mortgage Trust and
draws up foreclosure materials
Borrower's loan
materials after reviewing Borrower's
information on the MERS system.4 MERS is a national database
maintained
Electronic Registration
maintained by the Mortgage
Mortgage Electronic
Registration System, Inc., on
which "more than half of all home mortgage loans originated in the
[U.S.]" were registered
[U.S.]"
registered by 2004. 55 Because Borrower's loan fits the
definition
"high-cost home loan"
loan" under Georgia Code Section 77definition of a "high-cost
6
6A-2(7),
6A-2(7), Mortgage Servicing sends Borrower a notice of default and
the right to cure
cure within thirty days in order to avoid foreclosure
J.D. 2009,
2009, Georgia
State University
University College
College of
of Law.
•* J.D.
Georgia State
Law.
1. See Kathleen C. Engel &
Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance
Finance of
of
I.
& Patricia A. McCoy, Turning
Predatory
FORDHAM L. REv.
REV. 2039, 2044-45 (2007); Christopher
Predatory Lending,
Lending, 75 FORDHAM
Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory
Predatory
Structured Finance,
Finance, 28 CARDOZO
CARDozo L. REv.
REV. 2185,
2210 (2007)
(2007) (explaining
that in corresponding
2185, 2210
(explaining that
corresponding with
Structured
customers, loan servicers
servicers "receive
"receive monthly payments,
payments, monitor collateral, and when necessary foreclose
on homes").
Ohio Real Estate
Estate News,
News, http://ohiorealestatenews.wordpress.comlcategory/foreclosurei
http://ohiorealestatenews.wordpress.com/category/foreclosure/ (last
2. See Ohio
(last
visited Aug.
Aug. 24,
24, 2007) (suggesting
(suggesting that few lenders will foreclose until a borrower
borrower is more than two
months behind).
3.
I,at 2209.
3. See Peterson, supra
supra note I,
2211.
4. See id.
id at 2211.
5. Id.
Id.
6.
infra Part II.C.
6. O.C.G.A. § 7-6A-2(7)
7-6A-2(7) (2007). See infra
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proceedings.
proceedings.77 Two weeks later, having heard nothing from Borrower,
Mortgage
Mortgage Servicing
Servicing forwards notice of its intent to foreclose
forecloses8 and
and
drafts a notice of the foreclosure
foreclosure sale of Borrower's
Borrower's property to be
9
9
published in the local legal organ. After two more weeks, Borrower
Borrower
°
receives
receives a copy of this notice,1
notice, JO which Mortgage
Mortgage Servicing
Servicing then
submits
Fulton County Daily
Report for the
submits for publication
publication in the Fulton
Daily Report
first of four required
required weeks."
weeks. I I
Borrower contacts Mortgage
Mortgage Servicing
Servicing at this time asking for
leniency. He does not contest the three delinquent payments
payments but
requests additional time to come up with the money. The servicer
servicer
explains
explains that she is not authorized to make major changes to loan
Mortgage Trust.'
terms and instructs the borrower
borrower to call Mortgage
TruSt. 122 Borrower
Borrower
to speak to someone at Mortgage Trust about amending
tries in vain
3
13
loan.'
his 10an.
A month later, Mortgage Servicing conducts
conducts the foreclosure sale
14
on the steps of the Fulton County Courthouse l4
as an agent ofMERS,
of MERS,
15
surprisingly enters the
the mortgagee of record. 15 The servicer not surprisingly
6
lone bid on the property.16
property.' Three months later, Mortgage
Mortgage Trust
servicing contract
notifies Mortgage
Mortgage Servicing that the servicing
contract for a new
mortgage on the property is available. Thus, roughly two months
final default, his home
after Borrower
Borrower received notice of his third and fmal
was sold on the courthouse
courthouse steps, and a new borrower is making
mortgage payments
payments on and living in the residence within six months
of that default.
(2007).
7. See O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A. § 7-6A-(5)(13)(C(ii)
7-6A-(5)(13)(C)(ii)(2007).
7-6A-(5)11.
s.8. See id.
id. § 7-6A-(5)
I 1.
44-14-162 (2007).
9. See O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162
(2007).
10. See O.C.G.A.
44-14-162.2 (2007),
(2007), amended
amended by
531, 148th
148th Gen. Assem.
Assem. (Ga. 2008).
2008).
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2
by S.B.
S.B. 531,
11.
II. See O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A. § 9-13-141 (2007).
(2007).
12. See leanne
Jeanne Sahadi,
Subprime:
Help, CNN MONEY.COM,
MONEY.COM, Sept.
2007,
Sahadi, Sub
prime: Big Talk
Talk, Little Help,
Sept. 26,
26, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/2007/09/26/realestate/few-loan-modifications/index.htm (asserting
http://money.cnn.coml2007/09126/real_estate/few_loan_modificationslindex.htm
(asserting that
that loan
loan
servicers may
the number
number of
they can
modify without
without getting
the permission
of
servicers
may be restricted
restricted inin the
of loans
loans they
can modify
getting the
pennission of
loan pool
pool investors).
loan
investors).
13. See id.
(suggesting that
that lenders
lenders are not
staffed to
modification requests
by borrowers).
borrowers).
to handle
13.
id. (suggesting
not staffed
handle modification
requests by
14. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-13-160, 161 (2007).
15. See Peterson,
supranote
at 2212.
15.
Peterson, supra
note I,1, at
2212.
Shifi from
Process:A Functional
16. See Basil
Basil H. Mattingly, The Shift
from Power to Process:
Functional Approach to Foreclosure
Foreclosure
Law, 80
80 MARQ.
MARQ. L. REv.
REV. 77,78
77, 78 n.7
n.7 (1996).
(1996).
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This hypothetical
of
hypothetical illustrates
illustrates the central tension in the law of
nonjudicial
nonjudicial foreclosure: the viability of the current secured lending
17
model versus the protection of borrowers. 17
In many states, this
tension has taken on new policy dimensions
"predatory
dimensions in light of "predatory
subprime mortgages, those
lending" practices l8 and foreclosure on subprime
loans offered
offered to borrowers
borrowers with the poorest
poorest credit scores. 19 This Note
considers whether Georgia's existing nonjudicial
nonjudicial foreclosure law
sufficiently balances the individual
individual and institutional interests at issue
20
Part I outlines
in the subprime residential mortgage
mortgage context. 20
experience in the current increase
Georgia's experience
increase in subprime
subprime mortgage
mortgage
foreclosure, its general nonjudicial foreclosure process, and the
traditional
foreclosure. 2 I Part II
traditional policy justifications
justifications for nonjudicial foreclosure?
changes to or prohibitions on nonjudicial foreclosure
examines recent changes
elsewhere and extracts the policy motivations behind
in Georgia and elsewhere
22
those changes.
changes?2 Part III explains
explains that, while the factors giving rise to
the proliferation
of
subprime
proliferation
subprime lending have probably weakened the
traditional
strengthened
traditional policy defense of nonjudicial foreclosure and strengthened
Georgia
its criticisms, other factors will likely dramatically reduce
reduce Georgia
23
borrowing
borrowing opportunities
opportunities in the near future. In this light, nonjudicial
foreclosure reform or prohibition is probably not warranted
warranted because it

17. Patrick
and Statutory Redemption: The Soundness of Iowa's
17.
Patrick B. Bauer, Judicial
Judicial Foreclosure
Foreclosure and
TraditionalPreference
Preferencefor
Protectionover Credit,
1, 7 (1985).
(1985).
Traditional
for Protection
Credit, 71 IOWA L. REv.
REv. 1,7
18. Celeste
PredatoryLending-A Legal Definition and
and Update,
Update, 34 REAL EST. L.J.
18.
Celeste M. Hammond, Predatory
176, 178-81 (2005)
(2005) (asserting
predatory loans but all describe costs
176,
(asserting that there is no uniform
uniform definition
definition of predatory
and terms that raise
raise the costs of borrowing
borrowing without adding any benefits, and discussing the many
many
practices
practices associated with predatory lending, such as aggressive
aggressive marketing, high and changing interest
interest
rates, and prepayment
prepayment penalties
penalties for paying
paying the loan off early).
19. Id.
(explaining that subprime borrowers
Id. at 176
176 (explaining
borrowers typically have a FICO (Fair Isaac
Isaac Co.)
Co.) credit
less than 570); Dennis Hevesi, ABC's (andXYZ's)
score of
ofless
(and XYZ's) ofHome Buying, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
23, 2003,
11 (suggesting
(suggesting that subprime loans are those available
available to borrowers with credit scores
scores less than 620).
at II
20. See infra
infra Part III. Not all subprime
subprime loans are predatory, but the overlap between
between the two is
& Elizabeth Renuart, The Life and Debt
Debt Cycle: The Growing
Growing Debt
considerable. See Deanne Loonin
Loonin &
Older Consumers and Related Policy
Burdens of Older
Policy Recommendations, 44 HARv.
178
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 167,
167, 178
(2007). As a result, Although this Note focuses on the sufficiency of nonjudicial
nonjudicial foreclosure in the
context of subprime loans, predatory lending concerns
concerns are highly
highly relevant.
21.
infra Part
21. See infra
Part I.I.
22. See infra
infra Part
Part II.
23. See infra
infra Part
Part III.
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continues to preserve borrowing
continues
borrowing opportunities in an uncertain
uncertain lending
24
future. 24

I.BACKGROUND
I.
A. Subprime
andForeclosure
Subprime Lending,
Lending, Securitization,
Securitization, and
Foreclosure Rates in
Georgia
Georgia
American
American residential
residential foreclosure rates began a historic spike as
25 The national rate of foreclosure
early as 2005.
2005 .25
of
foreclosure in the first quarter
quarter of
26
26
2007 was the highest it has been in fifty years. In August, 2007, an
estimated 243,947 U.S. homes, or nearly
nearly one in 500, were subject to
27 Estimates of Georgia's
Georgia's28
reposse~sion?7
foreclosure, public auction, or repossession.
country.
the
in
highest
the
foreclosure rates place itit among
among the highest in the country?8
29 The
Subprime
Subprime mortgage foreclosure rates are particularly
particularly startling. 29
six
Center for Responsible Lending conducted a study of more than six
million subprime mortgages
mortgages that were entered into between 1998 and
the third quarter of 2006; the results indicated that one in five of the
subprime mortgages
mortgages made in 2005 and 2006 is likely to end in
3o Significantly, subprime mortgages
foreclosure. 30
mortgages are estimated to
one-quarter of today's mortgage market. 331I Because of
of
constitute one-quarter
scheduled "resets"
"resets" in adjustable rate subprime
subprime mortgages originated

infra Part HL.B.
24. See infra
m.B.
25. David
Homes, N.Y.
24,
25.
David Gonzalez,
Gonzalez, Risky Loans Help Build Ghost Town of New Homes,
N.Y. TIMES,
TIMES, Sept.
Sept. 24,
2007,
B 1.
2007, atat B1.
ElBoghdady &
& Nancy
ForeclosureRate Hits Historic
26. Dina EIBoghdady
Nancy Trejos,
Trejos, Foreclosure
Historic High,
High, WASH. POST,
POST, June 15,
2007,
2007, atat Dl.
01.
18, 2007, at
27. Vikas Bajaj,
Bajaj, Foreclosures
Foreclosures Surged 36% in August, Report Says, N.Y.
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,2007,
C3.
C3.
Foreclosure:A
J.-CONST., Sept.
28. Carrie Teegardin,
Teegardin, The Crisis
Crisis of Foreclosure:
A Sign of the Times, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Sept. 9,
2007,
State
2007, at Al
AI (citing
(citing Mortgage Bankers Association report). But see Carrie Teegardin, Foreclosures:
Foreclosures: State
'Crisis' Figures
14, 2007, at
company's
'Crisis'
Figures Way Off, ATLANTA
ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
J.-CONST., Oct. 14,2007,
at Al (questioning aa private
private company's
extreme
extreme projections of Georgia foreclosures).
foreclosures).
AL., CENTER FOR REsPONSmLE
RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
29. ELLEN
ELLEN SCHLOEMER ET AL.,
LENDING, LOSING
LoSING GROUND:
GROUND:
FORECLOSURES
IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET AND
COST TO
TO HOMEOWNERS
HOMEOWNERS 3
3 (2006),
FORECLOSURES IN
AND THEIR
THEIR COST
(2006),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/CRL-foreclosure-rprt-1-8.pdf.
http://www.responsiblelending.orglpdfslCRL-foreclosure-rprt-I-8.pdf.
30. [d.
Id. at
at 2-3.
2-3.
PredictsForeclosure
Foreclosurefor
5 Sub
Subprime
31. Ron
Ron Nixon,
Nixon, Study Predicts
for I in 5
prime Loans, N.Y.
N.Y. TIMES,
TIMES, Dec.
Dec. 20,
20, 2006,
at C4.
atC4.
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through 2007, the population of troubled subprime mortgages could
32
potentially rise throughout 2011.
2011.32
The increase in foreclosure rates on this type of loan reflects a
33 Historically, lenders originated
historic change in lending practices.33
and held the loan using their own money in what has been described
described
34
34
as the "two-party"
period.
After
the
Great
Depression,
the
federal
"two-party"
"three-party" mortgage system by creating a
government ushered in a "three-party"
secondary mortgage
market designed to protect borrowers by
35
35
loans.
underwriting
underwriting loans.
In the last two decades, the "private-label securitization"
securitization" model has
emerged
emerged as the predominant loan finance structure.3366 Within this
investment
framework, loans are bundled and sold to mortgage investment
vehicles, typically
trusts,
which
typically
increases the credit pool and spreads
lending risk from individual lenders
at-large. 37 This
lenders to investors
investors at-Iarge.
change
"credit-worthy" borrowers,
change has increased the number of "credit-worthy"
helping give rise to the modem subprime mortgage industry.38
industry. 38 The
system's
and servicing
system's underwriting, origination,
servicing mechanism
mechanism can
39
39
parties.
more
ten or
engage ten
or more parties.

NonjudicialForeclosure
Georgia Under
Under o.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162
B. Nonjudicial
Foreclosure in Georgia
44-14-162
The speed of Georgia's
Georgia's nonjudicial foreclosure process
process has been
been
an easy target
target for blame throughout the recent increase in foreclosure

32. Valerie
Valerie Cotsalas,
Cotsalas, Fear
32.
Fear of Foreclosure,
Foreclosure, N.Y. TIMEs,
TiMES, Apr. 22, 2007,
2007, at 11
II (explaining that an
"resets" to a higher interest
adjustable rate
mte mortgage "resets"
interest rate
mte after a few years at an
an attractive introductory
introductory
rate);
Real
Estate
News,
Mortgage
Reset
Graph,
Aug.
2008,
mte);
Real
Estate
News,
Mortgage
Reset
Gmph,
27,
2008,
http.//realestatenewsblog.blogspot.com/2008/08/mortgage-reset-graph-2008-2009-2010.html
(last
http://realestatenewsblog.blogspot.coml2008/08lmortgage-reset-graph-2008-2009-2010.html(last
visited
13, 2009).
visited Oct. 13,2009).
33. Peterson,
Peterson, supra
supra note 1,
I, at2191.
at 2191.
34.
34. Id. at
at 2194.
2194.
35.
35. Id.
Id. at2194-96.
at 2194-96.
36.
36. Id.
Id. at
at 2200.
37.
& Eric
37. Engel
Engel &
& McCoy,
McCoy, supra
supra note
note 1,
I, at
at 2041;
2041 ; Robert
Robert S.
S. Friedman &
Eric R. Wilson,
Wilson, The Legal Fallout
Fallout
from the Subprime
Subprime Crisis,
Crisis, 124
124 BANKING
BANKING L.J.
LJ. 420,
420, 421
421 (2007);
(2007); Peterson,
Peterson, supra
supra note 1,
I, at 2265.
2265.
38.
38. See
See Kenneth
Kenneth C.
C. Johnston
Iohnston et
et al.,
ai., The
The Subprime
Subprime Morass:
Morass: Past,
Past. Present,
Present. and Future,
Future, 12 N.C.
N.C.
BANKING
125-28 (2008).
BANKING INST.
mST. 125,
125,125-28
(2008).
39.
39. Peterson,
Peterson, supra
supra note 1,
I, at 2265.
2265.
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rates. 40 One Atlanta
Atlanta newspaper columnist
columnist explained that Georgia is a
state in which "the bank can grab your home without a court hearing
hearing
and before
before you have time to even realize what's happening"
happening" and
4
stop. ' In a recent case, even the
asserted that the practice
practice must stop.41
weighed in:
Georgia Court of Appeals weighed
40

In closing, we note that this litigation could well have been
prevented
prevented if Georgia law provided any kind of procedural
oversight-either
oversight---either judicial
judicial or administrative-for
administrative-for foreclosure
proceedings. The validity or invalidity of [the mortgagor's]
security interest in the Property
Property should have been resolved as
part of the foreclosure proceedings,
proceedings, prior to the negotiation of
of
any settlement agreement. Unfortunately, our legislature has
declined
declined to provide
provide such procedural safeguards
safeguards to homeowners
or to place any meaningful restrictions on mortgage lenders. In
In
light of the current mortgage crisis and high foreclosure rate
resulting from the practices
practices of the subprime
subprime lending
lending market, we
42
Assembly
to
address
this
important
issue.42
urge the General
General
general Georgia nonjudicial
Undoubtedly, the general
nonjudicial process
process is one of the
most rapid means of foreclosure
foreclosure permitted in the nation, with
43 This
completion possible in less than two months after default. 43
mechanism
mechanism contrasts the year-long process in states like Florida,
44
where foreclosure is possible only through the court system. 44
With
exemplifies the typical
some exceptions,
exceptions, Georgia's process fairly exemplifies
45 The system is one policy response
nonjudicial
foreclosure
remedy.
nonjudicial
remedy.45
LOAFING, Aug. 29, 2007,
40. E.g.,
Dome, CREATIVE
E.g., John
John F. Sugg, Let's Foreclose
Foreclose on the Gold Dome,
CREATIVE LoAFING,
2007, at
21.
21.
41. Id.
41.
Id.
42. Matrix Fin. Servs, Inc. v. Dean, 655 S.E.2d 290, 295 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
43. Jim Saccacio, The Best and
and Worst States for
TRENDS, Mar. 2006,
for Buying Foreclosures, REALTY
REALTY TRENDS,
http://www.realtytrac.com/news/customer/2006.3/index.asp.
http://www.realtytrac.comlnewslcustomer/2006.3/index.asp.
INCOMMUNITY
COMMUNITY &
44. Lisa Easterwood,
Easterwood, Is Bankruptcy Reform Legislation
Legislation Working, 17 PARTNERS
PARTNERS IN
http://www.frbatlanta.org/invoke.cfm?objectid=19422D38-5056ECON.
EcON. DEV. 2 (2007), available
available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/invoke.cfin?objectid=19422D38-50569F12-12E89D9C91AE28DB&method=displaybody.
9F 12-12E89D9C91 AE28DB&method=displaLbody.
45. FRANK S. ALEXANDER,
ALEXANDER, GEORGIA REAL ESTATE FINANCE
FINANCE AND FORECLOSURE
FORECLOSURE LAW § 8-2 (4th ed.
2007).
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to the lender-borrower
secured
lender-borrower power
power struggle that is as old as secured
46
itself.
lending itself.46
Georgia law makes nonjudicial foreclosure available to lenders
47
particular loan contract provides for it.47
when a particular
For that reason, it is
also known as "power
"power of sale" foreclosure, and the Georgia Supreme
Court has long enforced it as a contractual
contractual remedy subject to certain
certain
48
Georgia Code Section 44-14-162 sets forth
statutory requirements. 48
considered
the nonjudicial
nonjudicial foreclosure mechanism
mechanism for home loans not considered
49
loans.",,49 Upon default, the mortgagee
mortgagee intending to
"high-cost home loans.
foreclose is required to publish notice of the impending foreclosure
sale for four consecutive
consecutive weeks in the local legal organ after sending
a copy of that notice to the debtor at least thirty days prior to the
foreclosure sale,
proposed foreclosure sale. 5500 At any time before the foreclosure
borrower can redeem her interest in the property by curing the
the borrower
courthouse
conducted on the relevant county courthouse
51 The sale is conducted
default. 51
52
steps on the first Tuesday of each month. 52 In Georgia, the sale
53 -is not
price-although
price-although almost invariably below fair market value 53_is
not
subject to judicial
judicial confirmation
confinnation unless the lender
lender wishes to seek a
deficiency judgment.54
54 Lenders can seek a deficiency judgment
judgment
whenever the sale price is insufficient
insufficient to cover the cost of the
55
borrower's debt. 55 They rarely do so, however, because of the
difficulty in collecting
collecting from borrowers already
already unable to make

16, at
46. See Mattingly,
Mattingly, supra
supra note
note 16,
at 89.
89.
47.
47. 3A GA. JUR. Property
Property § 32:30
32:30 (2008).
(2008).
293
(Ga. 1944);
1944); Salter
Salter v. Bank
Bank of
of Commerce,
S.E.2d 290,
290, 293
48.
Guff v. Guff,
32 S.E.2d
S.E.2d 507,
507, 507
507 (Ga.
48. Gurr
Gurr, 32
Commerce, 66 S.E.2d
JUR. Property
(Ga. 1939). See generally
generally 3A
3A GA. JUR.
Property § 32:30 (2008).
(2008).
cost home
loans," see
see discussion
discussion infra Part II.C.
II.C. The
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162
(2007). For
49.
49. O.C.G.A.
44-14-162 (2007).
For "high
"high cost
home loans,"
The
to throughout
throughout this
mechanism set
forth in
in § 44-14-162
and those
mechanism
set forth
44-14-162 and
those like
like itit shall
shall be referred
referred to
this Note
Note as
as
"general" methods
of nonjudicial
nonjudicial foreclosure
contrasted by
applicable only
only to
certain loans.
loans.
"general"
methods of
foreclosure as
as contrasted
by those
those applicable
to certain
amended by S.B. 531,
531, 148th
50. O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162
(2007); O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2
44-14-162.2 (2007), amended
50.
44-14-162 (2007);
Gen. Assem.
Gen.
Assem. (Ga. 2008).
2008).
Uniform Nonjudicial
Nonjudicial
Foreclosure: The Uniform
51. See Grant
Grant S.
S. Nelson &
& Dale
Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure:
ForeclosureAct, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399,1438-39
1399, 1438-39 (2004).
Foreclosure
52. O.C.G.A. § 9-13-161 (2007).
(2007).
53. Mattingly,
Mattingly, supra
16, at
at 96.
96.
53.
supra note
note 16,
44-14-161(a) (2007); see also ALEXANDER,
54. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161(a)(2007);
ALEXANDER, supra
supra note
note 47, § 9-1.
9-1.
55. ALEXANDER,
ALEXANDER, supra
55.
supra note
note 45,
45, § 9-1.
9-1.
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56 Importantly, Georgia's
Georgia's general foreclosure
mortgage payments. 56
process
of
process does not provide
provide the borrower
borrower with a statutory
statutory right of
redemption.57
57 This right, given to borrowers in several states, entitles
entitles
the borrower to redeem
redeem her interest
interest in the property
property
during a
58
58
sale.
foreclosure
the
after
statutorily-defined period after the foreclosure sale.
statutorily-defmed

C.
TraditionalPolicy
ConsiderationsSurrounding
C. Traditional
Policy Considerations
Surrounding Nonjudicial
Nonjudicial
Foreclosure
Foreclosure

Nonjudicial foreclosure is available to mortgagees
mortgagees in roughly sixty
59
percent
jurisdictions authorize judicial
judicial foreclosure
percent of the states. 59 All jurisdictions
60
60
in some form. The primary reason advanced for permitting
permitting this
nonjudicial
nonjudicial foreclosure is that it is a cheaper and more efficient
6'
remedy.
remedy.61
In addition to the savings afforded by not requiring court
62 proponents argue that
proceedings,
proceedings,62
proponents
the lender's rapid foreclosure
decreases the risk of incidental costs from "vandalism, fire
ftre loss,
depreciation,
depreciation, damage, and waste"
waste" associated with a property
property in
default.63
63 Nonjudicial foreclosure is an unquestionably
unquestionably quicker
process than its counterpart
counterpart within the court system; in some64states,
as twenty
few as
as few
conclude in
can conclude
foreclosure
days.64
nonjudicial
in as
twenty days.
Under several theories, nonjudicial foreclosure also supports the
perspective is that a rapid and
borrower's interests. One economic
economic perspective
and
inexpensive
foreclosure best serves the most fundamental
inexpensive means of foreclosure
56. See John
Dowd, Jr.,
Comment, Allowing Cu"ent
Current Debtors
Debtors to Retain Collateral
John R. Dowd,
Jr., Comment,
Collateral Without
Reaffirming or
or Redeeming:
Balance Between Creditor
Creditor and
and Debtor
Debtor Rights, 17 Miss.
Redeeming: A Healthy
Healthy Balance
MISS. C. L.
REV. 131,
131, 147
147 (1996).
(1996).
REv.
57.
supranote 51,
51, at 1465
57. Nelson
Nelson && Whitman, supra
1465 n.252.
n.252.
58. Id.
Id at
at 1404.
1404.
59. See id
id. at 1403.
60.
supra note
note 16,
16, at
at 93.
93.
60. Mattingly,
Mattingly, supra
61.
Foreclosing on the American
American Dream:
Dream: An Evaluation
Evaluation of State and
and Federal
61. Debra P. Stark,
Stalk, Foreclosing
Federal
Foreclosure
REV. 229, 232 (1999).
Foreclosure Laws, 51 OKLA. L. REV.
62.
supra note 51, at 1403.
62. Nelson
Nelson && Whitman,
Whitman, supra
63.
Waldman, Committee
Committee Member,
Member, National
Conference of
of Commissioners
State
63. Ira Waldman,
National Conference
Commissioners on
on Uniform
Uniform State
Laws, Prefatory Note
Note on
on the Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act (Aug. 2,2, 2002), http://www.abanet.org/
http://www.abanet.orgl
rppt/cmtes/rp/i4/waldman-UniformNonjudicialForeclosureAct.pdf.
rpptlcmteslrp/i4/waldman-Uniform_Nonjudicial_Foreclosure_Act.pdf.
Setting Aside Nonjudicial
NonjudicialForeclosure
Sales: Extending
to
64. Molly F. Jacobson-Greany,
Jacobson-Greany, Setting
Foreclosure Sales:
Extending the Rule to
Cover Both Intrinsic
23 EMORY
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J.
J. 139,
Cover
Intrinsic and Extrinsic
Extrinsic Fraud
Fraud or Unfairness,
Unfairness, 23
139, 150-51
15~51
(2006);
n.10.
(2006); Stark, supra
supra note 61, at
at 232
232 n.IO.
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collateral to minimize
element of secured
secured lending: the use of collateral
minimize lender
lender
65
lowering lender transaction costs associated with defaulting
defaulting
risk. 65 By lowering
borrowers, nonjudicial
nonjudicial foreclosure arguably
arguably lowers mortgage costs
borrowers,
66
66
to
all
borrowers.
Others simply contend
increases
opportunities
and
borrowers
borrowers benefit
that in many cases mortgage default is clear, and
67
67
obligation.
debt
their
of
from the speedy release of their debt obligation.
perspective, judicial foreclosure may be
From the borrower's
borrower's perspective,
a
mortgagee
is given more time to redeem her
preferable
because
preferable
68
foreclosure. 68
to the
defenses to
legal defenses
interest in the property
property or raise legal
the foreclosure.
Nonjudicial foreclosures, on the other hand, have been described as
Nonjudicial
"harsh remedies
remedies because debtors lose their property in a proceeding
69 A consumer advocacy
oversight. ,,69
advocacy group has even
devoid of judicial oversight.,
"unfair
asserted that nonjudicial
nonjudicial foreclosure should be declared an ''unfair
governed by the
practice" in connection
and deceptive practice"
connection with loans governed
70
In cases where
federal Home
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act. 70
is
sufficient
involvement
or
state
government
federal
government involvement
sufficient to implicate
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment protections, courts have held that
nonjudicial foreclosure without personal notice or an
executions of nonjudicial
opportunity to present a defense violate borrowers'
borrowers' procedural
procedural due
process rightS.71
rights. 71 Finally, critics suggest that the court supervision
inherent in a judicial foreclosure
of a
foreclosure minimizes the likelihood
72
deficiency.
resulting
and
price
grossly inadequate
inadequate sale
and resulting deficiency.72

SCHMUDDE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MORTGAGES
65. See DAVID A. SCHMUDDE,
MORTGAGES AND
AND LIENS 126 (2004).
66. See id.;
id.; see also Waldman, supra
supra note 63.
63.
67. Id
Id
supra note 61,
61, at 232.
68. Stark, supra
supra note 64, at 151.
Jacobson-Greany, supra
69. Jacobson-Greany,
151.
70. Elizabeth Renuart, Staff
Staff Attorney, National Consumer
Consurner Law Center, Testimony
Testimony Before the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve Regarding
Regarding Home
Home Equity Lending
Lending and HOEPA
HOEPA (Aug. 4, 2000),
mortgage/hoepafl .shtml.
availableat http://www.nclc.orginitiatives/predatory
available
http://www.nclc.orglinitiativeslpredatory_mortgagelhoepaJl.shtml.
(S.D. Ga. 1975)
71.
Cameron-Brown Co., 410 F. Supp. 988, 989 (S.~.
71. Roberts v. Cameron-Brown
1975) (holding that the federal
Federal National Mortgage Association
government's
government's role in a mortgage
mortgage financed by the Federal
Association and subsidized
subsidized
Amendment's
through the National
National Housing Act was
was sufficient to constitute
constitute state action under the Fifth Amendment's
(W.D. N.C.
N.C. 1975) (finding state
due process clause);
Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250, 1256 (W.O.
clause); Turner v. Blackburn,
action sufficient
sufficient to justify Fourteenth
Fourteenth Amendment due process
process protection in a clerk of court's filing of a
report validating
validating a nonjudicial foreclosure sale).
sale).
Section
ForeclosedHomeowners:
72.
Ira B. Shepard, Antideficiency Relieffor Foreclosed
72. John Mixon
Mixon &
& Ira
Homeowners: ULSIA
ULSIA Section
(1992).
511(b), 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
REv. 455, 480 (1992).
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II. RECENT MODIFICATIONS TO
TO OR PROHffiITIONS
PROHIBITIONS ON NONJUDICIAL
NONJUDICIAL
II.
GEORGIA AND OTHER
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
JURISDICTIONS
FORECLOSURE IN GEORGIA

Changes to and
andProhibitions
Prohibitionson Nonjudicial
NonjudicialForeclosure
Foreclosure
A. Recent Changes
in Other
Other States Generally
Generally
In the last two decades, several state legislatures have added,
abolished, or significantly altered their general nonjudicial
changes illustrate the continued
continued
foreclosure procedures. 73 These changes
vitality of traditional
policy
debates
surrounding
this
form of
of
traditional
foreclosure apart from new considerations implicated by subprime
74 Illinois banned power of sale foreclosure altogether in
lending.74
75
1987.75 This remedy had been an available contract term since
1987.
76
common
On the balance,
balance, the change was described
described as an effort
common law. 76
by the legislature
"to
reduce
the
costs
of
foreclosure
and to increase
legislature
increase
77
occurred.,
sales
foreclosure
the prices at which foreclosure sales occurred.,,77
legislature added a new form of nonjudicial
In 1998, the Hawaii
Hawaii legislature
nonjudicial
foreclosure
combining
and
foreclosure
elements of its existing judicial and
78 The existing power of sale foreclosure
nonjudicial foreclosures. 78
of
disfavored because of
method had been in place
place since 1847 and was disfavored
criticized as taking a
its ambiguity while judicial
judicial foreclosures were criticized
year or more-a time during which rent and homeowner's
homeowner's
79
association maintenance
fees
did
not
have
to
be
paid. 79 Supporters
maintenance
Supporters
argued that improved
improved nonjudicial foreclosure was warranted
warranted because
more than ninety-five
went unchallenged.
unchallenged.88o° In
ninety-five percent
percent of foreclosures went
73. See, e.g., CAL.
CIV. CODE
CODE § 1367.4(c)
1367.4(c) (West.
(West. Supp.
CAL. CIV.
Supp. 2005);
2005); HAW.
HAw. REv. STAT.
STAT. ANN.
ANN. § 657-5
657-5
COMP. STAT. ANN.
ANN. 5/15-1405
. (LexisNexis
(LexisNexis 2007); 735 ILL.
ILL. COMPo
5/15-1405 (West
(West 2007).
2007).
74. See infra Part III.A.
1I1.A.
233.
75. 735
735 ILL.
ILL. COMP.
COMPo STAT.
STAT. ANN. 5/15-1405; Stark,
Stark, supra
supra note
note 61,
61, atat 233.
76.
FORECLOSURES IN
76. BRADLEY
BRADLEY V. RITTER,
RITTER, MORTGAGE
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES
IN ILLINOIS
ILLINOIS 481
481 (2006).
(2006).
77.
77. Catherine
Catherine A. Gnatek,
Gnatek, Note,
Note, The New
New Mortgage
Mortgage Foreclosure
Foreclosure Law: Redemption
Redemption and
Reinstatement,
ILL. L. REv. 471,471
Reinstatement, 1989
1989 U.
U.ILL.
471, 471 (1989);
(1989); see also Mattingly,
Mattingly, supra
supra note
note 16,
16, atat 120
120 n.179.
n.l79.
78.
REV. STAT.
78. HAW.
HAw. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 657-5
657-5 (LexisNexis
(LexisNexis 2007);
2007); see
see also Sandi M.
M. Skousen, New
Foreclosure
Option Combines Best of
1998,
Foreclosure Option
of Existing Processes,
Processes, PAC.
PAC. BUS.
Bus. NEWS,
NEWS, June
June 12,
12, 1998,
http://pacific.bizjoumals.com/pacific/stories/1998/06/15/story8.html;
http://pacific.bizjournals.com!pacificlstorieslI998/06/15/story8.html; David
David C.
C. Farmer,
Farmer, Hawaii
Hawaii Enacts
Enacts
Expedited
J., Nov.
Expedited Nonjudicial
Nonjudicial Foreclosure,
Foreclosure, HAW.
HAw. BUS.
Bus. 1.,
Nov. 1998,
1998, atat 42.
42.
79.
79. Farmer,
Farmer, supra
supra note
note 78,
78, atat 42.
42.
80.
80. Skousen,
Skousen, supra note
note 78.
78.
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apparent response
response to these
these concerns,
concerns, Hawaii
Hawaii Revised
Revised Statute
Statute Section
Section
apparent
the
existing
set forth
forth clearer
clearer notice
notice requirements
requirements relative
relative to
to the existing
667 set
power of sale
sale foreclosure
foreclosure mechanism,
mechanism, which
which was
was retained, and
and the
power
"alternate" procedure
procedure was made
made available
available at the
the election
election of
of the
the
new "alternate"
8
added clarity
clarity addressed
addressed the reluctance
reluctance of title
title
mortgagee. 81' Its added
uncertain
the
given
the
properties
insurance
insurance companies
companies to insure
insure
properties given
uncertain
82 Significantly,
Significantly, pursuant
pursuant to Hawaii
Hawaii Revised
Revised
finality of the sale.82
Statute Section
Section 667-35,
667-35, the
the borrower, the foreclosing
foreclosing mortgagee,
mortgagee, or
or
Statute
lienholder can
can compel
compel a judicial
judicial foreclosure
foreclosure via
via court order
order
any other lienholder
83
83
before the foreclosure
foreclosure sale.
at any time before
York legislature
legislature departed
departed from sanctioning
sanctioning
1998, the New York
Also in 1998,
84
84
only judicial
foreclosure. An amendment
amendment to New York
judicial means of foreclosure.
Real
made
Real Property
Property Actions and
and Proceedings
Proceedings Law Section 231 made
purpose:
significant
narrow
but
nonjudicial foreclosure available
available for a
significant
nonjudicial
85 This law did nothing to
foreclosure upon commercial
commercial property.
property.85
foreclosure
York residential property
property be
requirement that New York
modify the requirement
86
foreclosed upon through the judicial
judicial system. 86 Moreover, in
in
foreclosed
New
the
foreclosure,
permitting the commercial
nonjudicial
commercial use of nonjudicial
permitting
York legislature prohibited its use in situations in which residential
87 It continues to ban them in connection
tenants would be affected.87
to
residential property and enables commercial
commercial mortgagors
with residential
hardship." 88
"undue hardship.,,88
proving "undue
compel judicial foreclosure upon
upon proving
availability of nonjudicial foreclosure in
California narrowed the availability
homeowners associations
2005 by significantly limiting its use by homeowners

81.
81.

78, at
at 42.
42.
Fanner,
supranote
note 78,
Farmer, supra
82. Id.
Id.
82.
83.
43.
83. Id.
Id.at
at 43.
of
Foreclosure of
Nonjudicial Foreclosure
Article 14
14 Allows Nonjudicial
to RPAPL Article
S. Fries,
Fries, Amendment to
84. Richard
Richard S.
84.
at 50.
1998, at
ST. BUS.
Bus. J., Dec. 1998,
Commercial
N.Y. ST.
Mortgages, N.Y.
Commercial Mortgages,
50;
at 50;
2007); Fries,
Fries, supra note 84, at
(McKinney 2007);
1401 (McKinney
85.
85. N.Y.
N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW §§ 1401
at 88
Nov. 1998,
1998, at
Group), Nov.
REP. (West
(West Group),
REAL EST.
EST. L. REp.
Sale Law,
Law, REAL
Foreclosure:
Power of Sale
York Enacts
Enacts Power
Foreclosure:New York
Foreclosure].
N.Y.Y Foreclosure].
[hereinafter N.
85, at
at 8.
8.
86.
supranote
note 85,
N.Y Foreclosure,
Foreclosure,supra
86. N.Y.
87. Id.
Id.
87.
ESTATE
OF REAL
REAL ESTATE
LAW OF
W. BENDER,
BENDER, THE LAW
DWYER, &
& STEVEN
STEvEN W.
JEFFRY R.
R. DWYER,
T. MADISON,
MADISON, JEFFRY
88.
MICHAEL T.
88. 22 MICHAEL
(2007).
19:3 (2007).
FINANCING §§ 19:3
FINANCING
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89
Under
seeking to
to collect
collect unpaid
unpaid dues
dues by their
their members.
members.89
Under enacted
enacted
seeking
use
nonjudicial
Chapter 452, homeowners
homeowners associations
associations cannot
cannot use
Chapter
foreclosure to foreclose
foreclose on
on homes
homes unless
unless an
an individual
individual homeowner
homeowner
foreclosure
owes more
more than $1800
$1800 in
in assessments
assessments or
or owes
owes assessments
assessments for more
more
owes
90
90
than twelve
twelve months. In passing this
this law,
law, legislators
legislators in committee
committee
association
outstanding
over
their
home
referred
referred to a family
family that
that lost their home over outstanding association
of $1.50.
$1.50.9911 The statute
statute also increased
increased the notice required
required in
in
dues of
permissible applications
applications of
of nonjudicial
nonjudicial foreclosure
foreclosure by
by homeowners
homeowners
permissible
92
associations.92
Wyoming's foreclosure law
Amendments in 2005 to Wyoming's
associations. Amendments
requirements
also increased
increased the
the notice
notice
requirements of
of that state's
state's nonjudicial
nonjudicial
93
foreclosure procedure. 93
foreclosure

of
NonjudicialForeclosure
Changes to Nonjudicial
Foreclosure Law in the Context of
B. Recent Changes
Predatory Lending
Predatory
1.
1. A Model Act
Act

Several states have recently included explicit
explicit prohibitions on the
nonjudicial foreclosure in predatory
predatory lending legislation, but its
use of nonjudicial
use was not previously
previously sanctioned
of
sanctioned in those states for any type of
94
94
loan.
redundant prohibitions
prohibitions are based on
These seemingly redundant
95
provisions in the Home Loan Protection Act. 95
This model act,
promulgated by the AARP in conjunction with the National
promulgated
"protecting
2001, has the stated purpose of "protecting
Consumer Law Center in 2001,
borrowers," and aspires to
the homes and the equity of individual borrowers,"
secured-loans. 96 The
address the persistence of abusive terms in home secured-Ioans.
Act sets forth general restrictions and prohibitions as well as special
Foreclosures by
California Limits Foreclosures
89. Niki Zupanic, Keeping
Homes off the Auction Block: California
Keeping Homes
(2006).
199-200 (2006).
L. REv. 199, 199-200
37 MCGEORGE
MCGEORGE L.
Associations, 37
Homeowners
HomeownersAssociations,
Supp. 2005).
2005).
(West. Supp.
1367.4(c) (West.
CIV. CODE §§ 1367.4(c)
90. CAL.
CAL. CIV.
90.
supra note
note 89, at 199-200 n.14.
91. Zupanic,
Zupanic, supra
91.
92. Id.
Id.at
at 202.
92.
Broad
to the Broad
Law: Conforming
Conforming to
ForeclosureLaw:
93.
& Jack D.
D. Edwards, Wyoming Foreclosure
W. CQttam
Cottam &
93. Dale
Dale W.
1, ~
3-4 (2006).
L. REv.
REv. I,
Bill 112,
112, 66 WYO.
WYO. L.
by House
House Bill
Made by
Changes
ChangesMade
(West 2007).
2007).
ANN. §§ 46:
46:10B-26(k)
N.J. STAT. ANN.
See, e.g.,
e.g., N.J.
94. See,
94.
I OB-26(k) (West
2001) [hereinafter HLPA].
Ass'n of Retired
Retired Pers. 2001)
ACT (Am.
(Am. Ass'n
LOAN PROTECTION
PROTECTION ACT
95. HOME
HOME LoAN
95.
96.
§ I.
.
Id.§l.
96. Id
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restrictions on
on "high-cost
"high-cost home loans,"
loans," defined
defined as loans
loans whose
whose total
restrictions
interest rates,
rates, or
or prepayment
prepayment penalties
penalties exceed
exceed certain
certain
points and fees, interest
97
97
thresholds.
specified thresholds.
specified
Among these special
special restrictions
restrictions applicable
applicable to
to high-cost
high-cost home
home
Among
4(1) of the Act provides
provides that
that creditors
creditors making
making a highloans, Section
Section 4(1)
loans,
available in the
cost home loan
loan must use judicial
judicial foreclosure if it is available
cost
98
98
state in which the secured
secured property
property is
is located. For states that lack a
state
"full judicial
judicial foreclosure
foreclosure process,"
process," the Act proposes
proposes that such
"full
competent
creditors must
must "obtain
"obtain a declaratory
declaratory judgment
judgment in a court
court of competent
creditors
jurisdiction" that
that they have
have a legal
legal right to foreclose
foreclose before
before they
they can
jurisdiction"
99
remedy.99 In the comments
comments to this
exercise any available
available nonjudicial
nonjudicial remedy.
exercise
proposed section, the drafters
drafters indicate that its provisions
provisions are
proposed
of high-cost
high-cost loans
loans will always
"intended to ensure
ensure that borrowers
borrowers of
"intended
defenses
have an opportunity
opportunity to raise
raise any legal
legal
defenses they may have before
have
100
foreclosure."'
to
lost
are
foreclosure."loo
their homes
2. Adoption ofLegislation
Legislation Based on the AARP
AARP Model Act
Act
2.

Various states have enacted anti-predatory
anti-predatory lending laws since the
1 I1 Many of these lending
2001 promulgation
lending
promulgation of the AARP model act. 10
"high-cost home
laws incorporate
incorporate the model Act's definition of "high-cost
loans"
and
loans" and place the same restrictions on mortgage terms and
0
2
authorized
practices. 102 Nonetheless, states that previously authorized
nonjudicial foreclosure and have enacted an anti-predatory lending
law using the structure of the AARP model act generally have not
included its prohibition on nonjudicial foreclosure for high-cost home
97. Id.
§ 2(e).
Id.
2(e).
98. Id.
§ 4(1).
Id.
4(l).
Id.
99. !d.
100.
Id.
100. Id.
Under
Liability Under
and Assignee
Assignee Liability
Law Developments and
Lending Law
et aI.,
al., Predatory
PredatoryLending
R. Caggiano
Caggiano et
101. Julie
Julie R.
101.
62 Bus.
Bus. LAW.
LAW. 617,618-19 (2007).
StateLaw,
Law, 62
andState
HOEPA and
HOEPA
loans and
and placing
cost home
home loans
high cost
(2006) (defining
(defining high
102.
24-9-5-3(a) (2006)
§§ 24-9-2-8,
24-9-2-8, 24-9-5-3(a)
IND. CODE
CODE §§
See, e.g.,
e.g., IND.
102. See.
N.J.
high cost home loans); N.J.
(restricting high
(2003) (restricting
ANN. §§ 46:IOB-26
46:10B-26 (2003)
restrictions
N.J. STAT.
STAT. ANN.
on them); N.J.
restrictions on
58-21A-6(E)
46:10B-24 (West 2004) (defining high cost home loans); N.M. STAT. § 58-2IA-6(E)
STAT. ANN.
ANN. §§ 46:IOB-24
STAT.
see also
also
to judicial
judicial foreclosure proceedings); see
home loans
loans to
high cost
cost home
on high
(2007)
foreclosure on
(2007) (restricting
(restricting foreclosure
Home
The New
New Jersey
Jersey Home
Lending: The
Predatory Lending:
to Predatory
Response to
Baher
Reiss, Modeling
Modeling aa Response
David Reiss,
Baher Azmy && David
RuTGERS L.J. 645, 650 (2004).
of2002, 35 RUTGERS
SecurityAct 0/2002,35
OwnershipSecurity
Ownership
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103
loans.103
A version of the Model Act's Section 4(1),
4(1), for example, is
loans.
104 This is a
noticeably absent from an Arkansas version of the Act. 1°4
significant affirmation
affirmation of a lender-friendly
lender-friendly remedy in a lender-hostile
lender-hostile
significant
05
legislative
climate.'105 Recent New Jersey, New Mexico, and Indiana
legislative climate.
Indiana
laws, on the other hand, expressly prohibit the use of nonjudicial
foreclosure using language materially
materially identical
identical to that in the AARP
mechanism
model act even though such a foreclosure
mechanism was not
16
jurisdictions.
those jurisdictions. 106
otherwise
otherwise available in those

C. Nonjudicial
ForeclosureReconsidered
Reconsideredin Georgia:
Georgia:GAFLA
Nonjudicial Foreclosure
GAFLA and
"High-Cost
Home
Loans"
"High-Cost
The Georgia legislature was quick to pass its own version
version of the
AARP model act, and, as with versions of the Act enacted in other
nonjudicial
nonjudicial foreclosure
foreclosure states, its adaptation
adaptation stopped short of
of
covered loans although
prohibiting nonjudicial
nonjudicial foreclosure
foreclosure for covered
although it did
notice. 10 7 Georgia's
enhance the required notice.107
Georgia's version, the Georgia Fair
Fair
Lending
(GAFLA), was initially identified as among the toughest
Lending Act (GAFLA),
toughest
lending
lending laws in the nation, although subsequent amendments and
08 GAFLA
limited its reach.
federal preemption
preemption may have limited
reach.'108
103. See, e.g.,
e.g., ARK. CODE
CODE ANN. § 23-53-\04
23-53-104 (West 2007).
103.
2007).
Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53·\04
23-53-104 (West 2007) with HLPA, supra
supranote
104. Compare
note 97,
97, § 4.
generally, Baher
Circle: A
Case for States as
105. See generally,
Baber Azmy, Squaring
Squaring the Predatory
Predatory Lending Circle:
A Case
Laboratories
REV. 295
Experimentation, 57 FLA. L. REv.
295 (2005).
(2005).
Laboratories of Experimentation,
Compare IND. CODE § 24-9-5-3(a) (2006),
46:10B-26(k) (West,
(West, 2003),
2003), and
106. Compare
(2006), N.J.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:IOB-26(k)
N.M.
1A-6(E) (2007) with HLPA,
supra note
N.M. STAT. § 58-2
58-2IA-6(E)
HLPA, supra
note 95,
95, § 4.
as amended
amended at
at Ga.
107. Georgia Fair
Fair Lending Act,
Act, 2002 Georgia
Georgia Laws Act 488 (H.B.
(H.B. 1361)
1361) (codified
(codified as
Stat. § 7-6A-1
7-6A-I et seq.), amended by 2003
2003 Georgia Laws Act
Act I (S.B. 53);
53); Leetra Harris
Harris && Brian
Brian Nichols,
Nichols,
Credit or Loan Discrimination;
Discrimination; Define and
and Prohibit
Banking and Finance,
Finance, Credit
Prohibit Abusive
Abusive Home Loan
Practices;
Practicesand
and Limitations
Limitationsfor
Covered Home Loans and
and High-Cost
High-Cost
Practices; Provide
Provide for Prohibited
Prohibited Practices
for Covered
Home Loans; Create
Create Consumer
Consumer Protections
Protectionsfor
Covered Home Loans and
and High-Cost
High-Cost Home Loans;
Loans;
for Covered
Provide
Penalties and
and Enforcement;
Unintended Violations;
Providefor
Provide for Penalties
Enforcement; Provide
Provide Exceptions
Exceptions for
for Unintended
Violations; Provide
for
Severability,
REV. 14,
15 (2002).
19 GA. ST.
ST. U. L. REv.
14, IS
(2002).
Severability, 19
108.
supra note
108. Peterson, supra
note I,1, at 2243.
2243. The
The GAFLA was
was the subject of high-profile controversy in two
two
ways
ways soon after its
its passage.
passage. First, the Office of
of Thrift Supervision of
of the Department of Treasury
announced
announced that federal regulations preempted
preempted the
the GAFLA's
GAFLA's restrictions
restrictions on
on federally chartered
chartered banks
and
and their
their operating subsidiaries.
subsidiaries. Julia
Julia Patterson
Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging
Mortgaging the American Dream:
Dream:
Predatory
Lending, Preemption,
Federally Supported
Supported Lenders,
CIN. L. REv.
REV. 1303,
Predatory Lending,
Preemption, and Federally
Lenders, 74
74 U. ON.
1303, 1339
1339
(2006).
to the original GAFLA's
(2006). Second, in response
response to
GAFLA's broad
broad provisions
provisions for assignee liability, rating
rating
agencies
agencies such
such as Standard && Poor's indicated
indicated that
that they
they would no longer rate securities backed by
residential
statute. Id. at 1321.
1321. The rating
residential loans that originated
originated inin Georgia after the effective date of the statute./d.
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incorporated the AARP
AARP Act's
Act's requirements
requirements and
and limitations
limitations on
on "high"highincorporated
10 9 The
cost home
home loans"
loans" and
and defined
defined those
those loans
loans in
in the
the same
same way.
way.I09
cost
of the AARP
AARP Act's sweeping
sweeping
GAFLA was
was an early
early showcase
showcase of
GAFLA
IIO
110
ItIt instituted
of abusive
abusive lending practices.
practices.
instituted limits
limits on
on
regulation of
regulation
on
interest rates and marketing
marketing strategies
strategies and complete
complete bans on
interest
mortgage
mortgage prepayment
prepayment and modification
modification penalties."'
penalties. 111 The
The law also
also
mandates pre-loan
pre-loan counseling
counseling and
and declares
declares "unconscionable
"unconscionable and
mandates
void" loan terms
terms that
that specify
specify a litigation
litigation forum unfavorable
unfavorable to the
2
112 Notably, the law prohibits borrowers
borrowers from bringing class
borrower. 11
113
1
lenders.
against lenders. 13
action lawsuits against
substantive loan
Despite
Despite its extensive
extensive regulation
regulation of substantive
loan terms
terms and
and
GAFLA made only
only two changes
changes to the
the applicable
applicable
practices, the GAFLA
requirements
new
it
imposed
process:
foreclosure
nonjudicial
nonjudicial foreclosure process: imposed
requirements that the
cure the default
default at least thirty
borrower receive notice of a right to cure
days prior to the sale date as well as notice of the intent to foreclose
Act's
at least fourteen days prior to sale advertisement. 111144 The model Act's
covered
with
in
connection
prohibition on nonjudicial foreclosure
prohibition
foreclosure
connection
covered
15
loans was proposed but did not survive floor debate. II5
A
opposition to the ban argued that requiring
representative
representative voicing opposition
"every
foreclosure
to
go
through the
system'" would be
"every foreclosure to go through
the 'full
'full court
court system"'
consequences."" 6 Supporters,
one of the GAFLA's "unintended
"unintended consequences."II6
•
bill's
meanwhile, later counted the ban's removal among the bill's
1
117
compromises. 17

to limit
the statute to
agencies
agencies abandoned that position when the Georgia legislature quickly amended the
Id. at 1321-22.
diligence "safe harbor."
harbor." Id.
assignee liability and create a due diligence
assignee
RatingAgencies Allow
Subprime
Standardization: How Rating
109.
prime Standardization:
(2007); David Reiss, Sub
7-6A-2 (2007);
109. O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A. § 7-6A-2
L. REv.
REV. 985,1032-33
985, 1032-33
Mortgage Market,
Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
the Secondary
Secondary Mortgage
Flourishin the
PredatoryLending to Flourish
Predatory
(2006).
(2006).
1, at 2243.
supranote 1,
110. Peterson, supra
110.
111. D.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A. §§ 7-6A-5 (2007).
111.
112.
Id. §§ 7-6A-5(6)-(7).
7-6A-5(6)-(7).
112. Id.
Id.§§ 7-6A-6.
7-6A-6.
113. Id.
113.
Id. §§ 7-6A-5.
7-6A-5.
114. Id.
114.
at 37-38.
37-38.
supranote
note 107,
107, at
Harris &
& Nichols,
Nichols, supra
115. Harris
115.
Id. at
at 37.
37.
116. Id.
116.
Id. at
at45.
117.
45.
117. Id.
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SUFFICIENCY OF NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE LAW IN
III. SUFFICIENCY
IN
GEORGIA IN
IN THE
THE CONTEXT
CONTEXT OF
OF SUBPRIME LENDING
GEORGIA

A. The Appropriate
AppropriateLens for
for Examining
Examining the
the Sufficiency of Georgia's
Georgia's
NonjudicialForeclosure
ForeclosureLaw in
in the Sub
Subprime
Nonjudicial
prime Context
sufficiency of Georgia's nonjudicial foreclosure
Examining the sufficiency
remedy for subprime residential
mortgages entails both traditional
residential mortgages
118
8
and new policy considerations.
considerations." As previously stated, the central
tension in foreclosure law is the potential conflict between the
secured lending business venture and fairness to the
viability of the secured
119
borrower. 119
Protecting the former ensures that lending institutions
120 With
remain profitable. 12o
respect to the latter, shelter and personal
121
at
potentially at stake.
well-being are potentially
stake. 121
Traditional
Traditional foreclosure policy considerations
considerations continue
continue to frame
122
122
contemporary foreclosure
Recent changes to
contemporary
foreclosure debate and reform.
general nonjudicial
foreclosure
nonjudicial foreclosure processes in Hawaii,
Hawaii, New York,
California, and Wyoming
ostensibly
protect
Wyoming
protect borrowers through
123
heightened
heightened notice. 123 In the same vein, New York's 1998
amendments
amendments authorize the use of nonjudicial foreclosure
foreclosure but not in
cases where the borrower
can
prove
it
causes
"undue hardship.,,124
hardship.' 24
borrower
"undue
The New
amendments also limit the use of the new remedy
New York amendments
remedy to
commercial
commercial settings and, even then, essentially forbid its use in New
York City if more than sixty-five percent of the subject property
property is
25
used to house residential
tenants.
1
residential
125 Alternatively, the changes to the
general
nonjudicial
foreclosure
process
general nonjudicial foreclosure process in Illinois
Illinois and Hawaii, along
amendment in California and Wyoming
with its narrow amendment
Wyoming and its
118.
118.
119.
119.
120.
120.

See supra
supra Part
Part I.A.
LA.
See supra
supra Introduction;
Introduction; see also Bauer,
Bauer, supra
supra note 17, at 7.
7.
See SCHMUDDE,
SCHMUDDE, supra
supra note
note 65,
65, at 126.
126.
121.
121. Anne
Anne Balcer
Balcer Norton,
Norton, Reaching
Reaching the
the Glass
Glass Usury Ceiling:
Ceiling: Why
Why State Ceilings and Federal
Federal
Preemption
Subprime Mortgage
Mortgage Loans, 35
35 U.
U. BALT.
BALT. L. REV.
REv. 215,
215,
Preemption Force
Force Low-Income
Low-Income Borrowers
Borrowers into Subprime
227
227 (2005).
(2005).
122.
122. See supra
supra Parts
Parts I.C.,
LC., ILA.
123.
123. See supra
supra Part
Part B.A.
II.A.
124. MADISON,
BENDER, supra
124.
MADISON, DWYER,
DWYER, & BENDER,
supra note
note 88,
88, §§ 19:3.
19:3.
125.
125. See supra
supra Part
Part II.A.
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addition to the commercial
commercial lender's repertoire in New York,
reflect a
26
1
remedy.
efficient
lender's
the
on
focus
continued
continued policy
the lender's efficient remedy. 126
While these traditional
traditional policy concerns persist, potential changes
changes
to Georgia's nonjudicial
nonjudicial foreclosure remedy in the subprime
subprime lending
lending
127
considerations.
of
set
new
a
by
context should also be informed by a new set of considerations. 127
These
These include the highly securitized
securitized nature of subprime loans and the
128
special status of the subprime borrower. 128
Moreover, the GAFLA's
GAFLA's
covered loan terms and practices
limitations on covered
practices are also relevant to
the question of whether nonjudicial foreclosure
answer
foreclosure reform is an answer
129
29
to Georgia's mortgage
crisis.' Finally, any potential
mortgage foreclosure crisiS.
state-level changes to the subprime
state-level
subprime mortgage
mortgage foreclosure remedy
must be evaluated in light of national responses to the subprime
mortgage crisis, including130class action lawsuits, federal intervention,
and loan market backlash.
backlash. 130

B. Examining
Examining Georgia's
Georgia'sNonjudicial
Nonjudicial Foreclosure
Foreclosure Remedy for
Subprime
Subprime Loans
1. The Effect of the Secured
SecuredLending Model on the Efficiency
Defense ofNonjudicial
Nonjudicial Foreclosure
Foreclosure
efficient remedy continues to weigh
The lender's interest in an efficient
heavily on possible
possible foreclosure reform but may be diminished in light
13 1
of securitization. 131
Georgia's existing
existing nonjudicial
nonjudicial foreclosure
process
process provides even lenders of high-cost home loans with an
undoubtedly potent remedy.132
remedy. 132 It preserves
preserves the lender's right to sell
undoubtedly
the property
property within thirty days of sale advertisement
advertisement as well as its
133
On the surface,
surface, the ten or more
right to seek deficiency judgments. 133
of
parties constituting
constituting the cast of characters
characters that back various parts of
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
See infra
infra Part III.B.
HL.B.
See supra
supra Part I.A.
See infra
infra Part HI.B.
m.B.
See infra
infra Part llI.B.
m.B.
Seesupra
See supra Part I.A.
Saccacio, supra
supra note 43.
7-6A-5 (2007).
O.C.G.A. § 7-6A-S
(2007).
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contemporary subprime
lender's
the contemporary
subprime loan seemingly reinforce
reinforce the lender's
134
1
34
The compartmentalized
need for such an economizing process.
compartmentalized
role of the various players, however, has streamlined
lender's
streamlined the lender's
1135
35
overall scheme.
Loan servicers, for example, only handle direct
direct
interactions with borrowers and are insulated and supported by the
36 Technological
marshaled by third-party investment.
Technological
capital marshaled
investment.'136
advances
such
as
the
MERS
database
have
directly
reduced the
advances
database
137
37
transaction
foreclosure.'
transaction costs of foreclosure.
It has even
even been argued that
undercapitalized originators
originators front the secured lending industry as a
undercapitalized
"disposable filter," absorbing
"disposable
absorbing liabilities and expunging them through
138
bankruptcy or questionable settlement. 138
The proliferation
proliferation of the
secured lending model is evidence
evidence of the viability of this arrangement
arrangement
and its substantial deviation
deviation from
the early mortgage models that
39
foreclosure.
justified nonjudicial
nonjudicial foreclosure. 139
efficient
On the other hand, the borrower's
borrower's interest in an efficient
140
securitization.
by
undiminished
largely
is
foreclosure mechanism
mechanism is largely undiminished by securitization. 14o
Again, decreased
decreased foreclosure costs theoretically lower borrowing
14 1
To the extent that
costs and increase borrowing opportunities. 141
subprime loans are more likely to end in default, all borrowers
borrowers benefit
from a subprime lender's remedy that quickly puts foreclosed
142
market. 142
the market.
properties
properties back on
on the

134.
135.
135.
136.
136.
137.
137.
138.
138.
139.
139.
140.
141.
141.
142.

See Peterson, supra
supra note 1,
I, at 2265.
Seeid.
Seeid.
1, at 204
1.
Engel &
& McCoy, supra
supra note I,
2041.
See Peterson,
Peterson, supra
supra note 1,
I, at 2265.
Id.
[d. at 2273.
2273.
See Engel
& McCoy, supra
1, at 2041; Peterson, supra
2273.
Engel &
supra note I,
supra note 1,
I, at 2273.
See Engel &
& McCoy, supra
supra note I,
1, at 2041.
2041.
SCHMUDDE,
65, at 126.
SCHMUDDE, supra
supra note
note 65,
See
id.
Seeid.
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2. The Effect of the Special
Status of the Subprime
Special Status
Subprime Borrower
Borrower on
FairnessCritique
CritiqueofNonjudicial
NonjudicialForeclosure
Foreclosure
the Fairness
a.
Considerationsin the Nature
Due Process
a. Considerations
Nature ofDue
Process
Subprime borrowers
borrowers probably
probably have a heightened need for a fair
143
foreclosure
foreclosure proceeding.
proceeding.143
Even when mortgage
mortgage default is clear,
foreclosure
historically acknowledged
acknowledged a borrower's
foreclosure law has historically
borrower's interest
interest
l44
144
in a fair proceeding, judicial or otherwise. Subprime borrowers
borrowers are
vulnerable to the potentially
cascading effects of foreclosure
vulnerable
potentially cascading
foreclosure given
145
While this
their weaker credit scores and fewer credit alternatives.
altematives. 145
may tip the balance
balance in favor of enhanced
enhanced protection
protection for subprime
borrowers, some have argued that such borrowers are less responsible
responsible
146
about their loans and more brazen than other borrowers. 146
Others
point out that many subprime
subprime mortgages were issued to real estate
147
speculators
speculators investing
investing in residential
residential property.
property.147
The preemption issue
aside, it is also possible that subprime borrower protection,
protection, if
warranted, is granted by the restrictions
restrictions on unfair loan terms
48 Finally, subprime
contained
contained in the GAFLA. 1148
subprime borrowers might not
deserve special protections
protections for loans that would not otherwise be
be
available
to
them
but
for
the
lender's
unconventionally
available
unconventionally risky
49
lending. 1149
Fairness to the borrower can be measured
measured by both legal and
practical standards. Although
Although the GAFLA permits a relatively rapid
foreclosure process, it entitles borrowers to additional notice of the
right to cure and the intent to foreclose, it maintains
maintains general
general
of
nonjudicial foreclosure provisions for the right to notice of
143. See supra
supra Part I.A.
143.
144. See generally
generally Mattingly, supra
supra note 16.

16.

145.

Held Up in Due
Due Course:
Course: Predatory
PredatoryLending.
Lending, Securitization.
Securitization,and
and the Holder
Kurt Eggert, Held
Holder in Due
Due
Course
503, 571-72
571-72 (2002).
(2002).
Course Doctrine,
Doctrine, 35
35 CREIGHTON
CREIGHTON L. REv.
REv. 503,
Kathleen C. Engel
Engel &
McCoy, A Tale of
of
146. Kathleen
& Patricia A. McCoy,
of Three Markets:
Markets: The Law and Economics of
PredatoryLending,
Lending, 80
80 TEx. L. REv. 1255,
1255, 1358
(2002) (positing
Predatory
1358 (2002)
(positing that such buyers are more likely to use
mortgage money
the mortgage
money for luxury items rather
rather than for emergencies or repairs).
147. Vikas Bajaj,
Bajaj, Builders
UnderStrain,
TIMES, Mar. 7,
7, 2008,
CI.
147.
Builders andHomeowners Under
Strain, N.Y. TIMES,
2008, at Cl.
already provide
148. The restrictions on unfair practices
practices for high interest
interest home loans arguably already
provide
protections for subprime
& Nichols, supra
107.
subprirne borrowers. See generally
generally Harris &
supra note 107.
149. See supra
supra Part
Part I.A.
149.
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foreclosure thirty days before the sale, the right to redeem the
0
property
property until the sale, and limitations on deficiency judgments. 15
150
The notice formula required
required by GAFLA for covered loans is
sufficient as a matter of law; the Georgia Supreme
Supreme Court has held that
power
"state action,"
power of sale foreclosure does not involve "state
action," the trigger
trigger
151
151 In cases
for due process
protection
under
the
Fifth
Amendment.
process
where constitutional
constitutional due process has been required,
required, personal service
52
necessary.'
been
has
of foreclosure notice has been necessary.152
As a practical
practical matter, the borrower's
borrower's interest
interest in a fair foreclosure
153
proceeding probably extends beyond mere notice. 153
The foreclosure
proceeding
process is a clear
and
compelling
alteration
of
private
property
clear
154
154
interests.
In the residential property
property context, this alteration of
of
non-economic human
property interests affects
affects a fundamental,
fundamental, non-economic
155
concern:
concern: shelter. ISS Notably, the constitutional
constitutional formulation of due
process includes both notice and the opportunity
opportunity to be heard, and the
best indicia of the latter is the borrower's right to seek to enjoin
56
foreclosure. 1156

b. The Borrower's
Borrower'sLegal Recourse
Recoursefor
Nonjudicial
for Wrongful Nonjudicial
Foreclosure
Foreclosure
The only legal recourse for borrowers
borrowers in Georgia who believe they
are being subjected
subjected to wrongful nonjudicial foreclosure is a suit for
1 57
injunctive
A plaintiff has a cause
injunctive relief.
relief. 157
cause of action in wrongful
foreclosure
foreclosure when there is a violation of the statutory
statutory duty to exercise
exercise
158
a power of sale fairly and in good faith.158
faith.
In the secured
secured lending
context, a plaintiff's need to resort to a wrongful foreclosure lawsuit
lawsuit
is partially
a
consequence
of
loan
servicers'
inability
to
modify
partially
consequence
servicers'
150. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.1-.2 (2007), amended by S.B. 531 (2008).
ISO.
151. Parks v. Bank
of N. Y., 614 S.E.2d 63,
lSI.
Bank ofN.
63, 64 (2005).
ALEXANDER, supra
152. See ALEXANDER,
supra note 45, § 8-2.
generallyMullane
153. See generally
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank && Trust Co., 339 U.S.
U.s. 306 (1950).
(1950).
154.
154.
155.
ISS.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
at 313.
Id.at313.
Norton, supra
supranote 121,at227.
121, at 227.
Mullane,
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
314.
See Waldman,
supra note 63.
Waldman, supra
3A. GA.
GA. JUR. Property
Property § 32:36 (2008).
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1 9
terms. 159
Furthermore, Georgia borrowers are not entitled to a
tenns.
Furthennore,
statutory right of redemption even for loans covered by the
160
This means they do not have the option of curing a loan
GAFLA. 160
deficiency just one day
after the foreclosure sale even if they then had
so. 16 1
do SO.161
the money to do
In a suit to enjoin foreclosure, the increased number of parties with
increases the plaintiff borrower's
borrower's
a hand in a particular
particular mortgage increases
of
costs because he must identify and serve a greater
greater number of
162 This assumes
defendants. 162
borrowers subject to foreclosure have the
time and resources to individually secure counsel-a questionable
assumption because borrowers would probably not be in default in
relief.163
163 These
the first place if they could afford to sue for injunctive relief.
borrowers are especially harmed by the increased
increased costs of litigating
litigating a
64
l64
loan.'
securitized 10an.
securitized
specifically prohibits class action litigation
Moreover, the GAFLA specifically
165
home loan.
complaint
whose
borrowers
by
complaint concerns
concerns aa high-cost
high-cost home
loan. 165
The class action suit is generally intended to make a remedy available
available
to a large group of individuals with similar claims whose individual
166
Although at least one
losses are not practicable
practicable to litigate. 166
commentator has argued that foreclosure suits are not generally wellcommentator
suited to class action because
highly
because the facts and claims tend to be highly
1
67
individualized,
of
individualized,167 borrower groups have already filed a number
number of
68
such lawsuits around the country.'
country.168 Thus, the GAFLA class
class action
action
ban may materially
materially detract from subprime
subprime borrower
borrower protection. Many
Many
subprime
loan
contracts
make
litigation
considerations
moot
by
subprime
considerations

159.
Sahadi, supra
supra note
159. See
See Sahadi,
note 12
12 (suggesting that
that lenders
lenders are not
not staffed to handle
handle modification requests
requests
by
by borrowers).
borrowers).
160. See supra
supra Parts I.A,
I.A, II.C.
161.
Whitman, supra
supranote
1, at
161. See Nelson
Nelson & Whitman,
note 551,
at 1465 n.252.
n.252.
162.
162. Peterson,
Peterson, supra
supra note
note I,1,atat 2265.
2265.
163.
163. Id.
[d. at
at 2267-68.
2267-68.
164. Id.
[d.
165.
7-6A-6 (2007).
165. O.C.G.A.
O.C.O.A. § 7.f:JA.f:J
166.
Wastefiul?: The NASD's
166. Matthew
Matthew Eisler,
Eisler, Note,
Note, Difficult,
Difficult, Duplicative
Duplicative and Wastefol?:
NASD's Prohibition
Prohibition of
of Class
Action Arbitration
1905 (2007).
Arbitration in the Post-Bazzle Era,
Era, 28
28 CARDozo
CARDOZO L. REv.
REv. 1891,
1891,1905
(2007).
167. See Peterson,
Peterson, supra
supra note
note 1,I, atat 2268.
2268.
168.
168. Faten
Faten Sabry
Sabry && Thomas
Thomas Schopflocher,
Schopflocher, The Subprime
Subprime Meltdown: Not
Not Again!, AM.
AM. BANKR.
BANKR. INST. J.
1.
1,
I, 45
45 (Sept. 2007).
2007).
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providing
providing for mandatory
mandatory arbitration, the fairness
fairness of which
which has
has been
been
69
Additionally,
Additionally, reflecting
reflecting the
the difficulty
difficulty of
of
questioned in
in this
this context.'
context. 169
questioned
defensive litigation,
litigation, defaulting
defaulting borrowers
borrowers have
have increasingly
increasingly
defensive
70
bankruptcy.1
for
filing
by
foreclosure
responded to impending
impending foreclosure by filing for bankruptcy. 170
responded
These considerations
considerations raise a more general
general question:
question: Which
Which party
party
foreclosure proceeding?
proceeding? 17
1711 If the
should bear
bear the burden of proof in a foreclosure
borrower
borrower is truly in default, it does not seem overly
overly burdensome
burdensome to
172
place the burden
burden of proof
proof on the
the foreclosing
foreclosing party. In On
On the other
other
place
and
the
hand, the mortgage
mortgage debt is the
the borrower's
borrower's obligation,
obligation,
borrower
borrower may have better
better access to proof
proof that a payment
payment was made or
or
73 The burden of
that the loan
burden of
loan itself
itself was
was not validly
validly entered
entered into.
into. 1173
174
In
proof question goes
goes to the heart
heart of foreclosure policy.
policy.174
In isolation,
isolation,
determinative of
consideration to be determinative
however, it is too narrow a consideration
of
sufficiency.175
nonjudicial foreclosure's sufficiency.175
NonjudicialForeclosure
PredatoryLending the Bathwater
2. Predatory
Bathwater and Nonjudicial
Foreclosure
Crisis
ForeclosureCrisis
Georgia's Foreclosure
Alternative Remediesfor Georgia's
the Baby: Alternative
The sufficiency
sufficiency of Georgia's
Georgia's nonjudicial
nonjudicial foreclosure remedy in the
subprime
considered in a vacuum. Related
subprime context cannot be considered
economic variables
legislative, political, and economic
variables may make hasty
76 The GAFLA's
GAFLA's
changes to subprime foreclosure law short-sighted. 1176
enforced,
practices,
if
terms
and
lending
on
enforced, so
restrictions
dramatically alter the balance
balance between subprime lenders and
borrowers that it may more than address
address concerns over fairness, such

169.
169.
170.
170.
171.
171.

Peterson, supra
supra note 1, at 2268--69.
2268-69.
Easterwood, supra
supra note 44.
n.11.
supranote 61,
61, at 232
Stark, supra
232 n.l
1.
Tenant, 36
MARSHALL L.
Mortgage Tenant,
ResidentialMortgage
Day in the Life of a Residential
172. See Harold
Harold L. Levine, A Day
36 J.J. MARsHALL
REv. 687,
687, 694
694 (2003)
(2003) (explaining
(explaining that the burden of proof on a foreclosing
foreclosing party in a judicial
judicial foreclosure
"rapidly shifts to the defendant borrower").
"rapidly
CORNELL
Strict Liability
Crimes, 78 CORNELL
Defenses: Reshaping
Reshaping Strict
Good Faith
Faith Defenses:
173. See Laurie L. Levenson, Good
173.
Liability Crimes,
"better
of proof is often imposed on the party with "better
L. REv. 401, 467
467 (1993)
(1993) (noting that the burden of
the disputed matter).
evidence" related to the
access to evidence"
Seegenerallyid.
174. See
generally id.
IIL.B.3.
infra Part lll.B.3.
175. See infra
I.A.
176. See supra
supra Part l.A.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss4/6
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1226 2008-2009

22

Hester: Opportunity Costs: Nonjudicial Foreclosure and the Subprime Mort
2009]
20091

NONJUDICIAL
NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE

1227

chance
as the borrower's small
chance of obtaining injunctive
injunctive relief from
77
1
foreclosure.
wrongful
177
Moreover, a backlash of class action litigation nationwide will
likely provide redress for current Georgia
Georgia borrowers
borrowers while raising
1 78
The effect of the
borrowing costs for future Georgia borrowers. 178
government's "bailout" initiative-the Troubled Asset Relief
Relief
179
79
Program-is
still
unclear.'
Furthermore,
it
is
uncertain
whether
the
Program-is
unclear.
Furthermore,
GAFLA will see greater enforcement in the wake of Cuomo v.
Clearing
House Ass'n,
Clearing House
Ass 'n, a decision which calls into question federal
80 In the
short term, market
market
preemption of such state banking laws.1180
adjustments to the subprime
subprime lending industry will likely have a more
81
lender-borrower power struggle.
struggle.'181
Some predict
predict
direct impact on the lender-borrower
a return to the high down payment requirements and shorter mortgage
made home mortgages unavailable to
terms that traditionally
traditionally
82
subprime borrowers.1
borrowers. 182
The possible impacts of the GAFLA, the federal response, and
and
mortgage industry backlash
by
likely mortgage
backlash are probably not yet being felt by
currently triggering
triggering
current borrowers
borrowers because most of the loans currently
awareness of abuses in
foreclosure originated before
before the current awareness
183
securitization has
Thus, while securitization
predatory lending developed. 183
probably weakened the traditional
traditional efficiency justification
justification for and
strengthened the traditional borrower
strengthened
borrower fairness criticism
criticism of nonjudicial
influences will almost certainly
foreclosure, related influences
certainly reduce borrowing
borrowing
184
184
opportunities in the near future.
These influences
influences will probably
opportunities
also provide additional borrower
borrower safeguards particular
particular to subprime
185
lending. 185
The 2008 Georgia
General
Georgia
Assembly, for example,
example,
177.
178.
179.
179.
Al.
AI.
180.
181.
181.

See supra
supraPart III.C.
ilI.C.
See generally
& Wilson, supra
supra note 37.
generally Friedman &
Floyd Norris,
to Rely in Part
Money, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9. 2009, at
Baj/outto
Part on Private
Private Money,
Norris, U.S. Bank Bailout

Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
Mark
Home-loan Trouble
Trouble Spurs Fears
Crunch,' CHRISTIAN
Fears of U.S.
u.s. 'Credit Crunch.'
CHRISTIAN SCI.
Mark Trumbull,
Trumbull, Home-loan
MONITOR, Mar.
15, 2007, at 2.
Mar. 15,2007,
2.
182. Id.
Id
183. Cotsalas, supra
supra note 32, at 11.
II.
184. See supra Part I.A.
185.
185. See supra
supra Part ll.B-C.
ll.B--C.

Published by Reading Room, 2009
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1227 2008-2009

23

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 6
1228
1228

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
REVIEW

[Vol.
(Vol. 25:4

applicable requirement
increased the generally
generally applicable
requirement for notice of
of
foreclosure proceedings
proceedings upon a residence
residence under any power of sale
arrangement from fifteen to thirty days.186
days. 8 6 In this light, nonjudicial
foreclosure might well continue to insulate
insulate the lender from the risks
87
borrower.' 187
subprime borrower.
the subprime
harming
of lending without unreasonably
oflending
unreasonably harming the
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

Securitization
Securitization has facilitated
facilitated the proliferation
proliferation of subprime lending,
and, in turn, the dramatic
dramatic increases in U.S. foreclosure rates during
88 At the same time, this new lending
the last three years.
years.'188
infrastructure
infrastructure has probably weakened the traditional efficiency
efficiency
borrower
defense of nonjudicial
nonjudicial foreclosure while bolstering
bolstering the borrower
189
189
fairness argument
argument against it. Nonetheless, nonjudicial foreclosure
is a stronghold
legislative, political,
stronghold for borrowing
borrowing opportunities as legislative,
190
near future.
in
them in the
constrain them
and economic
economic forces will likely constrain
the near
future. 190
The GAFLA, if rigorously
rigorously enforced,
enforced, has the potential to reduce the
Georgia's
number of borrowers
borrowers whose interests are poorly served
served by Georgia's
swift nonjudicial foreclosure and the limited legal recourse that
191 This
process provides. 191
law is in fact a means of preventing the
foreclosure increases: abusive
likeliest long-term cause of the current foreclosure
192
192
For these reasons, reform or prohibition of nonjudicial
lending.
Georgia's
foreclosure should probably not be viewed as a remedy for Georgia's
193
current incidence
incidence of subprirne
mortgage foreclosure. 193
This
subprime mortgage
This
mechanism
mechanism is more accurately
accurately understood
understood as an important
important structural
of
support for the secured loan that insulates
insulates lenders from the risks of

186.
notice
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
191.
192.
192.
193.
193.

531. S.B. 465,
See O.C.G.A.
O.C.O.A. § 44-14-162.2,
44-14-162.2, amended by S.B. 531.
465, which would have
have extended
extended that
90 days
days for § 7-6A-2(7) "high
"high cost home
home loans,"
loans," failed.
period to 90
SCHMUDDE, supra
supra note 65,
See SCHMUDDE,
65, at 126.
See supra
supraPart
LA.
Part l.A.
supraPart
Ill.
See supra
Part m.
See supra
supraPart Ill.
IlI.
Seesupra
Bl.C.
See
supra Part II.C.
See supra
supraPart II.C
B.C
[l.B.
See supra
supra Part m.B.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss4/6
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1228 2008-2009

24

Hester: Opportunity Costs: Nonjudicial Foreclosure and the Subprime Mort
2009)
20091

NONJUDICIAL
NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
FORECLOSURE

1229
1229

subprime lending
lending by spreading
spreading some
some of the risk back onto the
subprime
94
1
borrower. 194
borrower.

SCHMUDDE, supra note 65, at 126.
194. See SCHMUDDE,

Published by Reading Room, 2009
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1229 2008-2009

25

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 6

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss4/6
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1230 2008-2009

26

